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Command and Technology in the Brit-
ish Army on the Western Front, 1917· 
1918. London: Routledge, 1992. 232 
pages. $89.00. 
E very study of the British Expe-ditionary Force of1914-18 must 
deal with the conditions under 
which that war was fought, the com-
manders who sent soldiers to fight 
in those conditions, and the enor-
mous casualties which the condi-
tions and the attacks produced. The 
risk of being mesmerized by the 
horror of the war is substantial. 
Tim Travers, however, has been able 
to look at the casualties and the 
British High Command without 
sacrificing clear analysis. His book, 
How the War Was Won, is exceed-
ingly stimulating in the process. 
Indeed, after reading this book, it is 
impossible to avoid speculating on 
the continuing debate over weap-
ons, strategy and tactics which 
marked the interwar years and even 
later. 
Arguments about mechanical 
and mobile warfare dominated 
military thinking throughout the 
Second World War and the two 
dominant weapons in this regard 
were the airplane and the tank. By 
1944 military planners had 
assumed that future campaigns 
would follow the pattern of fighting 
in North Africa where armour 
predominated. Consequently in 
1944 there occurred a 
reinforcement crisis in Northwest 
Europe where a very different 
pattern prevailed. There are still 
air power advocates who believe 
that wars can be won without 
ground forces, and still some who 
seem unaware that armour without 
infantry leads to a most precarious 
existence. But we should not forget 
that the development of aerial 
warfare and the "blitzkrieg" were 
the most important military 
concepts which developed after 
1918. Travers, of course, ends his 
work with the armistice in 1918, 
but the issues that fill his book are 
very much alive in following 
decades. 
In terms of tactical evolution, 
it is not too much to claim that this 
book is the most thoughtful study 
yet produced of the British 
Expeditionary Force during the last 
years of the war. Travers 
concentrates on three themes. 
First, he examines the extent to 
which final victory can be 
attributed to the British 
Expeditionary Force's command 
structure and senior leadership. 
Although he is critical ofHaig and 
the High Command, his 
investigation avoids the simplistic 
condemnations which still mar 
many studies of the British 
Commander-in-Chief. 
The second theme which runs 
throughout the book is an Finally, 
a third theme which runs 
throughout the book is the notion 
that the war was really over by the 
time the 1918 German spring 
offensive ended. Travers argues 
that "by not losing and by staying 
in existence, rather like the RAF in 
the Battle of Britain, the BEF and 
French Army essentially took the 
initiative away from the German 
Army." (p.llO) But even as he 
concludes this argument, he 
reminds us that "if one reads 
history forward and not backwards, 
if was still far from obvious in July 
[1918] how this war was to be won, 
or who was to win it." Moreover, 
the war did not begin to wind down 
in August 1918 if one considers the 
casualties. 
For the British Expeditionary 
Force the losses of the "Last 
Hundred Days" were greater than 
the casualties at Passchendaele. 
The high casualties resulted from 
many factors, but one of them in 
Travers' view was that the tactical 
methods developed in this stage of 
the war did not lead to a successful 
combination of all arms, including 
tanks and airplanes. Rather there 
appeared to develop a system which 
relied more on traditional methods 
with artillery predominating. 
Travers acknowledges that there 
was effort put into developing an 
all-arms tactical system, but it did 
not mature. 
It is, of course, possible to argue 
with a thesis that one finds thought-
provoking and fascinating. 
Consider for example "the story of 
the tanks after the initial surprise 
on 8 August." (p.127) Travers 
correctly objects to John Terraine's 
exaggerated claim that by the 
fourth day of the offensive "the 
number of tanks had dropped to 
six." One can agree with this 
correction and still be troubled by 
the explanation offered for the large 
number oftanks being knocked out 
- "the obvious reason for this was 
the failure of the planning staff, 
whether at corps, army, or GHQ 
level, to protect the tanks from 
anti-tank guns through the use of 
smoke, artillery, aircraft, or better 
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infantry-tank tactics." All ofthese 
good things should have occurred, 
but the obvious reason for the large 
number of tank casualties still can 
be attributed to the slow speed and 
fragility of the tanks themselves. 
What the tank corps most needed 
in 1918 was better and more 
reliable tanks. The possibilities 
existed in 1918 for great success 
with better technical equipment. 
But lacking the equipment it is not 
surprising to find that commanders 
turned increasingly to more 
traditional forms of warfare. 
Having argued with a tiny 
segment of Travers' thesis, it must 
be said that this book is an 
outstanding success for three 
reasons. First, it is a model of 
brevity and clarity. Given the 
subject, and the necessity of 
reviewing eighteen months of the 
most concentrated fighting in the 
war, I was astonished that Travers 
could make his case so effectively 
in 180 pages. On almost every 
page, moreover, one finds a 
sentence of great pungency. "Yet it 
was easier to retreat, even in panic 
and chaos, than it was to attack 
decisively, so the fact that the 
German spring offensives did not 
achieve their goals was critical." 
(p.107) Secondly, when I tried to 
disagree with what Travers wrote, 
when I tracked his research in the 
notes and checked a quotation, I 
found his research impeccable. 
Never did he fail to acknowledge a 
complication, a detail or a factor 
which might have weakened his 
case and in the end this 
strengthened his argument. Indeed 
by the end of the book the 
overwhelming impression is one of 
thorough research and careful 
scholarship. Finally, this book 
more than most, is not only a fine 
piece of historical analysis, it is a 
springboard for thought about 
following events. 
A.M.J. Hyatt is Professor and Chair, 
Department of History, University 
of Western Ontario. He is the au-
thor of General Sir Arthur Currie: A 
Military Biography, 1987 and a 
Contributing Editor to CMH. 
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1945. Stoney Creek, Ontario: For-
tress Publications, 1992. 208 pages. 
$34.95. 
F or this study of soldiers at war, it would have been 
difficult to pick a more 
representative Canadian group 
than the Fifth Canadian Infantry 
Brigade, part of what insiders were 
to call the "Hard-Luck Div," the 
2nd Canadian Infantry Division. 
Because of his extensive work on 
the Maple Leaf Route series (with 
Robert Vogel) and his pioneering 
analysis (with Bill McAndrew) of 
the devastating effects of combat 
stress (Battle Exhaustion), Copp is 
on familiar terrain in trying, quite 
successfully as it turns out, to 
restore respectability to narrative 
history as an acceptable and 
legitimate method of reexamining 
certain contentious aspects of the 
struggles of the Canadian army in 
North-WestEuropefrommid-1944 
to late spring 1945. With respect to 
leadership, motivation and 
performance, Copp, impervious to 
controversy, makes effective use of 
source materials (though limited 
in breadth) to fly in the face of 
convention and advance theories 
and uncover truths that may not 
be well received in certain circles 
which for too long have been content 
to allow the sleeping dogs of myth 
to lie undisturbed. (The word "lie" 
may be construed in either of its 
two principal senses.) 
Copp is part of what is rapidly 
becoming a tradition in competent 
history circles. He does not set out 
deliberately to sculpt clay feet onto 
idols made so in the blind heat of 
patriotic fervour but using sound 
research he and others (too 
numerous to mention) have 
reduced these epic figures to human 
proportions rightly ascribing to 
them more faults than qualities 
when such is the case and 
measuring the effects of these 
shortcomings in the bloodied 
columns of casualties. 
Like Britain in 1914-18, 
Canada had its rich crop of 
mediocrities in the later war. Some 
were put into positions of power 
through the "old boys" network 
which often proved to be 
incestuously nefarious and only 
rarely and fortuitously beneficial. 
Fortunately, for every Foulkes 
there was a Matthews but 
frequently not until too high a price 
had been paid. Contrary to the 
tendentious contentions of TV 
personalities who dabble in 
hysteria, Canada is blessed with 
some historians who seldom flinch 
from criticizing when it is 
warranted. 
However, this does not 
preclude their being queried when 
they proffer weakly supported 
beliefs. Copp, for instance, has 
long believed in the mass patriotic 
fervour animating the first 
volunteers in 1939. In The Brigade, 
he questions the belief that the 
men of St. Henri (Bonheur 
d'occasion; The Tin Flute) all enlist 
for jobs after years on 
unemployment. Roy bluntly states 
that many of her people had found 
"le salut dans la guerre." 
Admittedly, her Emmannuel 
Letourneau is an idealist concerned 
for the fate of Poland, and Azari us, 
crestfallen at the fall of France, 
wants a piece of Hitler's mustache, 
but for many, the rifle was the first 
instrument of work they had had 
in their hands for years. One of 
Roy's denizens cynically dismisses 
an indifferent democracy now 
crying for help from those it had 
previously abandoned. This 
passage is paralleled almost exactly 
in Irene Baird's Waste Heritage 
where the central character speaks 
in much the same way about the 
country that has no use for him 
and those who like him at the 
moment but which will soon call on 
him (and them) to dispel the 
gathering clouds of war. Hugh 
MacLennan puts these final words 
to the tune of"The Old Grey mare" 
-"there are no bums in the Jarvis 
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